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LITERATURE AS A FINE ART 
"The art of reasoning," says one of Wordsworth's eminent 
eulogists, "even the art of coherent speech, was to the poet a 
kind of art of lying. " "The whole energy of his mind was spent 
to reunite what men had put asunder, to fuse in holy passion 
the differences that are invented by the near-sighted activities 
of the discriminating human intellect." "The unsophisticated 
perceptions and thoughts of children and of the peasantry, of 
half-witted human creatures and of the animals that are nearer 
to earth than we, lent him a more rompanionable guidance [than 
his own intellect and] to these spiritual directors he submitted 
his heart in humble reverence and gratitude. " 
I own I am not sure that the moment has rome when such 
assertions seem to damn the poet. A few years since when they 
were uttered they took nothing from his eminence. They were 
orthodox romantic doctrine. But to-<iay they appear, to me for 
one, so discriminatingly true of Wordsworth, and at the same 
time so na'ive in their intention to praise, that I have been em-
boldened to ask whether the shifting mood of the times may not 
have brought us again to Jeffrey's Sense of the humours of the 
romantic attitude. 
Romanticism was at bottom an assertion of the senses against 
the intellect-against what Wordsworth himself called 
II ••• the false secondary power 
That multiplies distinctions." 
And it was but natural that it should have run to excess. The 
perception of excess is itself a distinction of the intellect. And 
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the romanticists repudiated the intellect. They did, perh·aps, 
much good. They revived suppressed emotions. They gave the 
rein to impulses that may have been enchained by false re-
straints. But when they proclaimed the supremacy of the senses 
in matters which were in their nature essentially intellectual-
in literature for example-they laid themselves open to the 
charge of having abandoned their wits. 
Literature is intellectual, and the romantic attempt to assimi-
late it to the sensuous fine arts-to give it emotion without 
intellection, imagery without idea, style without structure-gave 
us a lively literature indeed, but a literature that had missed its 
point. It was an attempt from which literature is still suffering. 
But latterly, with the confusion that such a movement must 
inevitably bring, there has occurred a curious inversion. The fine 
arts have asserted an intellectual quality. We hear of the thought 
of a painting or a sonata. The fine arts are now popularly sup-
posed to be the materials of culture. They are put into systems 
of education. Clearly here is a ~Jaoo-~ apply the power that 
multiplies distinctions, which Romanticishl, began by eschewing 
and has ended-with what intelligence the, eschewal implies-
by reasserting in an impossible place. For the fine arts can not 
convey thought, and are not agencies of culture. And as for 
literature, it is not a fine art. 
I 
To say that a painting-to take the art of painting as typical 
-does not convey a thought to the mind is not to affront art. 
It is simply to mark a distinction that corresponds to the truth 
that words do not present sensations to the senses. The mental 
reactions in the two cases are quite different. Painting gives to 
the mind through the senses the thing itself to be apprehended. 
Language, by means of arbitrary symbols, gives to the mind not 
the thing itself but something about the thing--some relation-
ship, some classification, some generalisation, some cause, some 
effect, some attribute-something that goes on wholly in the 
mind and is not sensuously present in the thing itself. This 
latter process is thought. And I think, I am not going beyond 
the bounds of common usage when I add that the only vehicle of 
thought is statement. I can conceive no other vehicle than 
statement for saying, for example, "When I am grown old and 
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death approaches let there be no turmoil of mourning for my 
departure. .. The wish, the circumstances, the relationship 
between them, have no external equivalents. And though in 
Crossing the Bar Tennyson uttered the wish in what we may term 
sensuous language, yet there is no sensuous equivalent for what 
he wished to express. It is in the nature of such a process that 
it is internal; and it is in the nature of the arts that they 
are objective and appeal wholly to the senses. 
To say this, however, is not to say that no thought is involved 
in art. Other things being equal the painter's product may 
indeed be enriched in its own peculiar kind by the richness of his 
ideas, general and technical. And to say this is not to say that 
the observer may do no thinking as he stands looking at the 
picture. He does, it is true, receive from the canvas nothing but 
the visual impression of things themselves. But with a given 
observer this may not end the matter; it does not say what in 
his mind .. the picture may evoke. A picture may evoke ideas 
though,it can not convey them. There is no certainty that the 
ideas ~hat arise in his mind are those that were in the mind of the 
painter as he conceived and executed the picture. Not until 
every line and colour, every light and shadow, shall have come, 
like words, to have a definite, conventional meaning, shall he 
be able to tell with certainty what were those thoughts and 
ideas. Have we on the canvas before us mother and offspring 
or nurse and charge? Is it a madonna, or is it Rachel with a 
servant's child, mourning for her children that are not? We 
can tell only by the title, and th~t is language. 
It is true that if the painter, out of a rich nature and a wide 
experience, has attained to a keen sense for whatever unformu-
lated laws there may be by which emotion and experience are 
written on men's faces, he may hope, indeed, that an observer 
rich too in nature and trained in those same laws will think 
back from the lines and shadows on brow and cheek and mouth 
to the same emotion or experience from which the painter 
started. And in truth the painter may come so near to convey-
ing what we may term a thought as would be conveyed by the 
words "she loves, " or II she is in trouble, "-matters which are 
not visual but purely ideal-though the symbolic means are 
uncertain even to so broad an end. If we look, however, into 
the range of . even such possibilities we find it very narrow, 
largely limited to the human face and figure and the symbolic 
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trappings of social life, and leading back seldom more than a 
single step to a very general condition behind it. A piece of 
literature so limited in thought would be ridiculous. The 
observer may, of course, think as much as he pleases, just as he 
may think as much as he pleases whatever he may be looking at. 
In the presence of a picture his mental process is the same as 
before a silent, 'motiouless object: what is conveyed is an image; 
his thoughts are his own thoughts. 
What has strengthened the belief in the intellectual accom-
plishment of the picture has been the characteristic romantic 
confusion of revery, of the vacant or the pensive mood, with the 
process of thought. Sensuous beauty stirs the emotions; the 
roused emotions are thronged with imagery and fleeting sug-
gestions; and the mind is agog with a stimulated activity very 
easy, especially for the romantic mind, to mistake for a flow of 
ideas. Now it is significant that the modern claim for thought 
in a picture is coincident with the growth of impressiortism in art. 
Art of the classical school was comparatively generalised: the 
painter suppleniented and modified his immediate perception of 
the object before, him by the aid of his memory of that thing as 
seen before, and ~i',thatkind of thing as seen at various times 
and under varying conditions; so that the resultant picture was 
less strikingly un.ique, was sobered, was in a sense un.iversalised. 
The emotional response to it was correspondingly sobered, and 
though it stimulated a more thoughtful attention, it never, in 
fact, stimulated a claim that it conveyed thought. 
It is a commonplace to say that the emotions are compara-
tively sluggish in the presence of a generic conception, and are 
quickened in the presence of the specific. Impressiouistic art, 
discarding the memory, purging the mind of all preconceptions, 
and endeavouring to capture the fleeting sensation of a moment's 
glimpse, attacks the emotions sharply with its unique image. 
The emotional response is all that is asked. There is no matter 
in the picture for thoughtful study; it must be got at a glance or 
wholly lost. And this impressionistic art, which in reality is far 
less concerned with thought than the art of the classic school, 
none the less stirs the emotional revery that is so easy to mistake 
for it. In the event it has remained for the most thoughtless art 
to lay the strongest claim to thought-a paradox that is not 
without its own tacit criticism, not ouly of the impressiouistic 
school-which is beside the present point-but of the whole 
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romantic misnomer of the emotional revery as a process of 
elevated thinking. 
II 
Decadence arises out of the primary pursuit of secondary 
functions. But though we may assert that the expression of 
thought is the primary function of literature, and that its use to 
stimulate sensuous imagery is secondary and, as a primary 
pursuit, decadent; yet the presence of such poets as Wordsworth 
!'oDd his followers and of the taste that approved them makes it 
apparent that such a distribution of primary and secondary was 
not to the mind of the romantic age. Some analysis, therefore, 
of the nature of the elements of which literature is built-the 
word and the sentence-may help to fix the distinction. 
At the basis of the matter is the fact that language is an 
affair of conventional symbols, fairly stable and fairly definite. 
The difficulty with line and colour, light and shadow, on the 
woman's brow is that men have not agreed that just those marks 
should mean, say, "fear for the future." Such an agreement for 
every mark in the picture would mean the destruction of the 
most valuable quality of painting-its plasticity. But the phrase 
"fear for the future" has for all English-speaking people a fairly 
uniform meaning just because they have agreed upon the sig-
nificance of every mark and every sound presented to the senses. 
Language can convey thought because writer and reader and 
speaker and hearer have got together, in effect, and entered into 
a specific compact as to the meaning of every stroke. It is the 
fair degree of uniformity in this agreement that gives language 
its power to call up in the hearer the idea in 1;,/1e mind of the 
speaker. 
It is at this point that the romanticists of art and the modern 
romanticists of philosophy-the pragmatists-join hands. It 
may therefore be worth while to make a brief examination of 
their respective positions in order to clarify the distinction be-
tween the word and the image, and so between literature and 
art. The romanticist values highly the object itself or the illusion 
of the object in art, and the direct emotion that the object or the 
illusion stimulates. To him that object is in itself the truth, and 
its literary value is its emotional value. The intellectual false 
secondary power, because it dims the vital reality of the mental 
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impression of such .. truth, " seems to him not to reach the mark. 
So inadequately does language convey this kind of truth that, as 
Wordsworth's eulogist says, "the art of reasoning, even the art 
of coherent speech, was a kind of art of lying." Reality is fluid, 
continuous; things merge into each other by imperceptible 
gradations; whereas words contract and crystallise and make 
sharp demarcations. To the romanticist, consequently, the 
best part of language is that which comes nearest to evoking the 
images of sensuous reality. 
The pragmatists, for their part, though they approach the 
discrepancy from the opposite direction, arrive at the same 
dissatisfaction. They are concerned with reasoning, and they 
recognise that explicit reasoning is done in words. They see that 
the rational process takes place between concept and concept-
that reasoning is not the concept of the thing itself, but the 
nexus between concepts. It is essential to reasoning, however, 
that the concepts should be clearly conceived and stable; and if 
the reasoning is to be true, it must concern reality as it is. But 
how, they ask._callthfs be done in words? Given the word tree, 
it corresponds to no particular tree. It names a class, but there 
is no such thing as class in nature, in reality. In nature there is 
nothing but individuals. Class is a human conception, a human 
convenience, a makeshift, associating a number of things no two 
of which are exactly alike. Looked at microscopically such a 
classification is gross. It may do very well for the coarse pro-
cesses of everyday life, but for philosophy, where absolute truth 
is at stake, no reliable conclusions can be certainly arrived at 
by it. And moreover, if every individual member of every class 
had a special name, even then reasoning with those names would 
not be reliable, for aside from the fatal impossibility of generali-
sation, nothing remains the same for successive moments. Or-
ganic matter wastes and bnilds; inorganic matter disintegrates; 
ions speed away into space leaving the original entity less and for-
ever different. Everything is flux, so that absolute truth, if at-
tainable one instant, would not be true the next. Such is the 
logic, whether romantic or pragmatic--if indeed these are not two 
names for the same thing--of those whose prime concern is for 
thing. 
If the universe is looked at from the point of view of things, it 
may well be true that things are insufficiently stable to act as the 
premises of reasoning-that they change even while the rea,soning 
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process is going on, so that when the conclusion is reached the 
premises are no longer valid. From the point of view of human-
ity, however, which has invented the rational process for its own 
use, such reasoning--for even the pragmatists reason vigorously 
--is beside the point. For the human mind there stands in the 
midst of changing individual exemplars a class name tree, which 
indicates a conception more stable than any single exemplar-an 
intellectual convenience because it is more stable. When the 
need comes to apply a rational idea to a particular sensuous case, 
recognition must indeed be made of the individual variation from 
the class type. But the need of such adju.stment is inherent in 
the human situation: thought and sense perception are not the 
same thing; each takes place, so to speak, in its own compart-
ment forever disjoined from the other save for the connecting 
link of the intnition. Reality is in truth a flux, a chaos. Into the 
midst of it the human intelligence has been thrust. It possesses, 
on the one hand, the mirroring power of the sense perceptions; 
but they alone would give it no bearings. It has, on the other 
hand, the power of conceiving relationships. If this power is to 
be of any service in orientating the chaos it must, it is true, estab-
lish a connection with the sense perceptions. But for its own 
proper exercise the matter with which it deals must in itself be 
stable or there can be no reliability of conclusion. Re3.lity and 
the sense perceptions not being stable, the intellect must in its 
own compartment erect those correspondent concepts by which 
the world of reality is stably orientated. Fundamental to this 
process of orientating the chaos is classification, then a sym-
hoi for the class, and so at last a stable datum for the reason. 
Whether or not with Plato we explicitly believe in an ideal 
prototype, fixed and eternal, of which the fluctuating reality is 
but an indifferent imitation, we must, if we reason at all, postulate 
such a stable prototype. Such a thing is the basis of reasoning; 
without it there could be no reasoning. To rebuke it for its dis-
cords with reality is to misapprehend its nature. A consciousness 
aware of no ideal stability, aware of nothing but the incalculable 
flux, could never have arrive.! at the conception of reason. 
And so the pragmatist, viewing the process of reasoning from 
the point of view of the flux, casts his doubts upon it, as well he 
may. The Rhennish salmon might well doubt his ability to build 
a Cologne cathedral of Rhennish water. The romanticist and the 
pragmatist, swimming in the flux- of things, may well doubt their 
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ability to build anything stable of the stuff of that fluid medium. 
Reason is not founded on the basis of the incalculable flux. 
Reality and language belong to two distinct categories. WordS, 
the symbols of concepts, belong to the stratum of thought and 
reason, not to the stratum of reality and sense perceptions. Art, 
which simply adds an object to be perceived by the senses, 
belongs to the stratum of reality. 
Thus pragmatism, though in its own activity somewhat futile, 
does us the momentary service of clarifying the distinction be-
tween the word and the image, and so the fundamental distinc-
tion between literature and art. 
If we look to the mere complex elements of language we have 
but a more obvious confirmation of the belief that the peculiar 
function of literature is to convey thought. Language has uui-
versally evolved the statement-so uniformly, indeed, that we 
may think of the statement as we do of the word-as innate. 
And the statement is peculiarly limited to the process of bringing 
concepts into relationship and uttering truths about them-a 
process that in its nature is one of thought. The words in a 
statement, being mere symbols and not the things themselves 
or the illusions of them, can in themselves, unlike the painting, 
put nothing new into the mind of the reader. Their only power, 
as individual words, is to call up to the centre of his attention 
ideas that are already stored in his mind. But they have, in 
grammatical succession, this power: they can put the ideas that 
are already stored in his mind into new combination. The 
whole process, the whole point of the statement is to bring the 
images, the ideas, the concepts that are embodied in words and 
already held in solution in the reader's mind, into new and sig-
nificant relationships. And this is a process of thought. This 
is the creative power of the statement; it is the only creative 
power of the statement; it is, as a consequence, the only creative 
power of literature. It is siguificant, therefore, for our conclu-
sion, that the only creative power of literature is a matter of 
thought. 
Naturally enough, however, an individual mind may fall far 
short of the collective mind through which. a language has 
evolved, and turuing back upon the intellectual path may cast 
aside the classification or other relationship symbolised in the 
single word, and substitute a single image. Tree may evoke a 
particular tree;justice may be simplified to a single circumstance. 
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The simpler the mind and the more meagre the experience, the 
mme individual, when that experience is called upon, will be the 
conception that comes in response to the symbol. If I have seen 
but few trees; and but few instances to which I have attached the 
term justice. and if I have been far more concerned with things 
than with thoughts, my mental response to those terms will 
be correspondingly sharp, and individual, and concrete. 
From some such fact arises our saying that children and 
savages have more vivid imaginations than civilised men. No 
doubt from some such conception did Wordsworth "submit his 
heart in humble reverence and gratitude" to the "spiritual 
direction" "of children and of the peasantry, of half-witted 
human creatures, and of the animals that are nearer to earth than 
we. " No doubt from some such fact did he prefer, in his theory 
of poetic diction, words which in such mouths were most free 
from intellectual content. And though he was by no means able 
to live up to his theory in his choice of words, yet the very 
quality of his poetic purpose was displayed in it. He strove to 
go counter to the inherent function of his medium and make his 
words serve the simple end of evoking the simple image-the end 
pursued by the painter. He did pretty well. For even the culti-
vated mind, by virtue of its power to fill in a generic conception 
with the individual elements which it involves, can simplify the 
general into the particular; and so it is possible, even for such 
a mind, to use words in a way almost to eliminate thought, and 
do little more than create an image. 
In the sentence too it is possible so to combine words as to 
reduce to a minimum the mind's attention to the relationship 
inherent in the sentence form. There are colourless verbs, verbs 
that declare sensuous acts, connectives that merely locate objects 
in visual space, so th~ too it is possible to produce upon the 
reader's mind an imp~approximating that of the painting. 
•• 
". . . I saw a crowd, 
A host of golden daffodils; 
Beside the lake, beneath the trees, 
Fluttering and dancing in the breeze." 
It is not that such mere imagery is impossible in words and 
sentences; it is not even that such imagery is illegitimate in 
literature. Such imagery is among the valuable possibilities at 
its command. The evil is that they should be elevated to the 
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first place as Wordsworth elevated them. How inadequate such 
an inversion is, is recognised by Wordsworth's own eulogist. 
"How," he asks, II except in some transcendental sense, can a 
moral expression be given to a sunset? No clearly rounded 
period can reproduce that marvel with all its vague messages to 
the heart. And it was this sort of power, and this sort of beauty, 
that was the inspiration of Wordsworth's poetry." His aim, in 
other words, was to use language, not for intellectual and moral 
ends, but for sensuous and resthetic ends. It is for such primary 
use of a secondary function that Wordsworth subjects himself 
to the criticism of being a decadent; and it is against a taste that 
tolerates the confusion which such decadence entails that it 
seems timely to repeat, and ever, to repeat the protest of Lessing-
the protest of those in whose vision of life literature fills a nobler 
place than that of pander to the senses. 
How wrong the romanticists' conception of the function of 
literature is, has a demonstration perhaps more convincing than 
that of the nature of words and sentences. The word and the 
sentence are not the consciously wrought elements of literature. 
They are lingnistic, and descend to us out of the darkness. 
What may be held as more significant, therefore, is the conscious 
use to which they have been successfully and pers;stently put. 
The genres which have grown up under conscious selection should 
show what, historically, has been the deliberate judgment of men 
in the matter. 
That language is the one medium suited to the conveyance of 
thought is sufficiently declared by the fact that it has always 
been the prime agent of those processes that are wholly matters 
of thought -criticism, science, philosophy, even pragmatic philoso-
phy. The doubt and confusion, however, with which we are now 
concerned arises about those other genres to which other than 
intellectual and moral ends have been attributed-those which 
are more narrowly called pure literature-the epic, the prose 
narrative, the drama, and the lyric. These are the consciously 
wrought genres which have given rise to the fusion of literature 
and the fine arts. 
The distinction, however, now that we are on the ground, 
seems even here simple enough. Though there are other ends to 
which painting may be used, such as matter-of-fact illustration, 
the fine art of painting in common with the other fine arts has 
had unifonnly an resthetic end. It is the fundamental character-
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istic of the resthetic that it appeals to the mind through the 
sense, that the senses are the medium of our perception of beauty 
-that beauty, except in a merely figurative sense, inheres only 
in sensible objects. The intellectual, on the other hand, has no 
direct relation to beauty. It resides, not in the sensuous things 
in which beauty may inhere, but in the mental nexus between 
them. We should expect, therefore, that just as the processes 
that make use of the sensuous media-;>ainting, sculpture, music, 
and architecture--have an resthetic end; those which make use 
of an intellectual medium shonld have an intellectual and moral 
end. This, we shonld say, moreover, would be still more un-
doubtedly the case if, as far as conld be judged from history, these 
latter processes-the literary-had grown up through a demand 
for their intellectual and moral accomplishment. And in fact 
such is the actual case. What is the most striking verdict of the 
past, indeed, is the utter absence of any recognised literary genre 
wholly given over to those resthetic purposes which characterise 
the fine arts. Even though it is entirely possible for langnage to 
approximate such a purpose, no such genre has survived. 
It is not that such a possibility has been until our modern 
times unknown. It is not that we have discovered a new use for 
an old instrument. Such a use is as old as literature--sufficiently 
old, at least, to have provoked Plato's protest when he saw it 
undnly emphasised, and to have characterised Plato's practice 
in moderation and subordinately to an intellectual purpose. It 
is highly significant, therefore, that though men have been fnlly 
aware of the sensuous possibilities of language, yet no genre 
corresponding to the epic, the prose narrative, the drama, and 
the lyric has persisted of which the prime function is purely 
sensuous. The sensuous element in all the persistent types 
has been wholly subordinate and secondary. 
It is not difficult, on the other hand, to believe that these 
persistent types do in fact owe their survival to their intellectual 
element. What is dlfficn1t is to imagine a narrative--using the 
term loosely to cover the epic, the novel, and the short story-in 
which the successive events have nothing to do with each other-
in which, in other words, the intellectual and moral relationship 
of cause and effect is not the informing-element. We may indeed 
have a volume of short stories or ballads in which such a chain is 
constantly broken. That, however, is not a matter of literature 
but of the bindery. When the line of cause and effect ends, the 
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piece of literature as such ends. If our concern were purely 
resthetic it would make no difference whether the successive 
events were interre1ated-whether we knew of the early seduc-
tion of Tess, whether we knew that Sohrab and Rustum were son 
and father, we should be concerned with each successive image 
for itself, just as we demand no antecedent picture to the Mona 
Lisa; no subsequent picture to a landscape of Corot. 
So completely is our concern in a novel or an epic bound up 
with the relationship of cause and effect-a purely intellectual 
conception-that we can not conceive such types of literature 
without it; and indeed without it such types could not exist. 
Even should we reduce the narrative to such sensuous simplicity 
as Daudet has done in his "pastels"-to minute particles--and 
reduce each particle as nearly as may be to a series of objective 
sensuous images, yet those pastels gain each its significance from 
the idea to which the sensuous images belong. .. The little 
Dauphin is ill; the little Dauphin is dying," begins one; and the 
significance of a whole series of images is thus gained-else why 
mention the fact? Before we are through we have sensuous 
images enough to warrant the conclusion, expressed in the Dau-
phin's own words, that in the presence of death· earthly rank is 
of little comfort. The very quality of narrative is this relation-
ship-a fact that separates it sharply and forever from the 
purely sensuous purpose of the piece of fine art; For what is the 
significance of this demand for cause and effect, this concern for 
consequences and conclusions, but an intellectual curiosity, and 
ultimately a moral compunction in the presence of life? It is 
true that with a given reader the intellectual and moral essence 
may be obscured, just as with a given observer the resthetic value 
of a work of art may be obscured. And in a given narrative the 
intellectual and moral value may be low just as may the resthetic 
value of a piece of fine art. None the less the aim of each is 
determined, not by the obtuse reader or observer, or by the 
unsuccessful example, but by the touchstones which long ex-
perience has applied, and by which have been determined the 
surviving types. In literature that touchstone has been men's 
intellectual interest and moral concern in the spectacle of human 
life. 
That Aristotle agrees with this idea may be nothing; but that 
Aristotle's judgment has been confirmed by the judgment of 
ages; and that those trial types that have not conformed to this 
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judgment have been willingly let die by men who have never 
heard of Aristotle or his judgment, is not without significance. 
We skip, not the action, but the description, not the current of 
cause and effect, but the part that stops to give a sensuous 
image. Our concern is intellectual and moral. 
In the drama this is even more obviously true. Here the 
whole demand is for so close-wrought a chain of causal relation-
ships that no room is left for deviation, no chance for sensuous 
description; and though the whole is sensuously enacted before 
the spectator, J@; the significance is wholly in the causal relation 
revealed in the words. Every unmotivated action is a blemish. 
The lyric at first sight seems to offer more difficulty. It is 
in lyric poetry that the romanticists have found their pleasantest 
grounds. It was the decadent lyric poets that the moralist Plato 
railed against more than two thousand years ago. It was the de-
cadent lyric poets that the moralist Tolstoi railed against the other 
day. Ali literature is susceptible to the over-cultivation of its sub-
ordinate qualities, and the lyric is peculiarly susceptible. For its 
avowed attempt is to present an idea in all its moving power. 
Emotion may be stimulated by the concrete matter of the poem 
whether the idea is present or not; and there is the chance of the 
romanticist. Nothing can prevent one who has no intellectual 
tastes, and for whom life is a matter of beer and skittles and the 
titillation of his sensibilities, from ignoring the one and indulging 
the other. . 
And yet in the nature of the lyric seems to be sufficient 
indication that here as in other poetry the idea is primary and the 
emotion seoondary. The persistent types are characterised by 
their ideas. The ode sets out with its idea; the sonnet with its 
idea; the ~legy with its idea. The love lyric, classified by its 
emotion, iills back, in the event, for its materials upon thoughts 
about this pregnant feeling. 
II Then come kiss me, sweet and twenty; 
Youth's a stuff will not endure." 
The lyric, like the other genres that use the intellectual medium, 
seems to bl' rational in its intention. 
The confusion in the case of the lyric, and to a degree in the 
whole case of literature, arises out of the romantic identification 
of all the emotions as resthetic. Now if anything may be said of 
the resthetic it is that it is one of the co-ordinate exercises of the 
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mind, parallel with the intellectual, the moral, the religious, and 
others. And of the emotions it may be said that they are not 
co-ordinate with the intellectual, the moral, and so on, but are 
concomitant with them all; that thel[ are the running obbligato 
to all the other preoccupations of 'consciousness. There are 
intellectual emotions, so to say, that arise at the perception of 
logical relationships and ideas, such as every thinking being 
experiences at the triumphant moment of understanding or 
discovery: 
II Then felt I like some watcher of the skies 
When a new planet swims into his ken. " 
The love of truth is an intellectual emotion. There are moral 
emotions such as love, hate, terror, pity, sympathy, and the host 
of feelings that arise over this most extensive preoccupation of 
humanity. There are emotions that accompany sensation. Of 
these last, those that arise at the sight or sound or imagination of . 
sensuous beauty are properly described as !eSthetic. To en-
deavour to spread the term msthetic to all emotions is to render 
it meaningless; yet how ready the decadent is to do so is shown 
in his eagerness to bring even Aristotle to his aid and claim him 
as an !eStheticist because he has said that the service of tragedy 
is to rouse and purge the emotions of terror and pity in the minds 
of the spectator. 
Why the decadent is so anxious to identify all the emotions as 
!eSthetic is perhaps not difficult to understand. The !eSthetic is 
felt to be an end in itself; it is an enjoyment pure and simple; it 
looks no farther than the moment of its experience; it has no 
ulterior responsibilities. It is the easiest of all ends, for its basis 
is in what all men inherently possess-the sensations-and its 
attainment is sponta.I)eous and pleasant. The other ends claimed 
for literature are on the contrary more difficult. The intellect 
grows only under rigid discipline; its exercise is bound by exact-
ing standards. The moral sense is weighted with the direst 
responsibilities. The intellectual and the moral together are 
fraught with the heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelli-
gible world. The resthetic is the escape from all this. Not but 
that such an escape in its proper sphere, in its own city of refuge, 
is a boon. The sense of beauty is one of the choicest possessions 
of mankind. But if all cities, even the capital city, are to be 
turned into cities of refuge, where are order and justice to be 
administered? 
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To think of literature as primarily resthetic in its purpose 
would appear to be one of the shifts of mental lassitude, an 
evasion of the pains of thought, of the burden of moral obliga-
tion. It is possible to be too rigid in our conclusions--to look too 
wholly without bowels of sympathy upon that beauty in litera-
ture which gives it much of its charm, and by endearing it to our 
intenser affections makes its sterner aspects more lovely and 
acceptable. Literature without the grace of beauty-Ibsenism, 
Zolaism-is, like the life it depicts, a repulsive thing. Yet if we 
think of the nature of words, of the nature of language, of the 
nature of those demands under which the persistent types of 
literature have developed, it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
literature is primarily, not resthetic, but intellectual and moral. 
Our protest is not against a thing, but against an excess; not 
against a proportion, but against a disproportion. 
The robust intelligence, unafraid of the rigours of its own 
exercise, finds some censure to bestow upon a lassitude that 
would, for its own sensuous gratification, ~pread abroad the 
rumour that literature belongs to the realm of sensations and 
sensuous emotions--some censure to bestow upon a literary taste 
that would elevate to a high place in its regard a poetry that 
ministers to mental lassitude, and, like the Daffodils, has 
little point save the gratification of the sensuous emotions. For 
my own part, realising that in the last analysis human nature is the 
most important element in life, I humbly dare to propose human 
nature with all its complexity, its subtle fluidity, its mysterious 
consciousness, as the subject of literature. And recognising that 
literature must reflect this complexity, I believe that this re-
flection can be thrown by no mere sensuous surface, after the 
manner of the fine arts. It must be more than simply visual, and 
more than simply auditory. 
To accomplish its purpose the spirit of literature has 
sought out the one medium suited to intellectual ends, has 
used that medium exclusively, and has developed ouly genres 
whose organic structure is wholly intellectual. In view of these 
considerations I can conclude only that literature is not a fine 
art ministering to the emotions, but a reflection of human 
nature, intellectual in its mode, critical in its spirit, and moral in 
its function. 
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